*What follows is an academic paper I wrote in October of 2012 which has some interesting background facts on Putin and the state of Russian politics. Additionally, I feel compelled to point out that I had a much firmer grasp on foreign policy than the Obama administration. I am unsure, however, whether having an edge on the Obama administration is truly something worth bragging about.
We live as a part of a highly dynamic world; ever in flux, with new potential challenges and rewards just around every corner. It is the simple complexity of our world that creates difficulties in determining the right path to take and, often, keeps the US in a reactionary mode in dealing with problems abroad. However, there are keys to unlocking the future, and steps that may be taken to best predict the next great challenge(s) our nation faces. Understanding where we have been can often shed light on that which we are headed for; just as many disciplines of study, understanding the foreign affairs of the past positions the US to best accomplish the goals for the future. The US is in a unique global position which affords us and our allies a certain level of security, while simultaneously providing great incentive to those who would wish to occupy our position in the global hierarchy. There are no simple answers for determining our next great challenges, just as there were no guarantees of predicting recent history. Still, we must persevere in obtaining that all-elusive truth of what it is exactly we do face and not always dwell on that which we wish we were facing.
There are potentially innumerable threats lurking in the coming years; but there are signs that point to one of the next great foreign policy challenges being one we are rather familiar with: Russia. For those that clearly remember the Cold War and the fear inherent of a pending nuclear disaster, such as the Cuban Missile crisis, cynicism towards the remnants of the Soviet power would be natural. This is a rather likely apprehension towards a foe, suddenly turned ‘friend,’ which was handed from one generation to the next; down to those of us who remember new global maps on a yearly basis in high school as the tapestry of Soviet power unraveled at the seams. However, there is an old adage ‘that just because you are paranoid, does not mean they are not after you’; and this is an important distinction.
Recent, post-Cold War changes in Russia give a certain level of credibility to the idea that Russia may be the Soviet bear in a state of hibernation rather than a fledging new democracy with similar goals as the US. It is incumbent upon us to understand the recent changes shaping Russia’s domestic and foreign prerogatives and apply that to the not-too-distant history of conflict and antagonism between the US and Russia. Next, we must make the effort to understand the state of the Russia and place into perspective what options the people and their leaders may have; with a particular focus on the preeminent leader of the former Soviet core, Vladimir Putin. What strategic moves and alliances are the leaders of Russia making and nurturing and what does that indicate for the future? Finally, and most importantly, we should reflect upon our own foreign policy of recent years and how we are likely to engage Russia in the future.
It is from these considerations that we may be able to predict potential situations of conflict in our ongoing relations with Russia and what appears to be a growing divide between our two nations. After gaining an understanding of where we stand we are much better prepared to gain an impression of where we are going. Imagine the advantage, to not only our nation, but to the world if we might actually be able to foster friendship in the face of pending conflict.
There seems little necessity in belaboring the events of the Cold War except to highlight the, often times, monolithic nature of the Soviet threat to the US and the world. What does bear some examination is the political, economic, and social environment of Russia in the years since the Soviet collapse. From the ashes of dictatorial governing under the Soviet regime came the rise of what seemed to be a new democratic state, eager to reenter the global community. It was thought that post-Soviet Russia would embrace the concepts of a market-economy and, in it, discover a new era of prosperity for its people. This, however, was not to be the case.
Although the new leader of the independent Russian state, Boris Yeltsin, advocated democracy and capitalism, Michael McFaul (2000) points out the general lack of understanding in Russia as to what that exactly meant; particularly after spending the better part of a century under a command economy (pp. 51). In fact, McFaul (2000) points out that there was less than a consensus across the country in precisely what economic and political system was desired; and Yeltsin came to the quick realization, not unlike other reformers and revolutionaries, that toppling a system was much easier than establishing one (pp. 52). Yeltsin, and other leaders new to the concepts of democracy and capitalism, found great difficulty in making the transition from the iron fisted will in which communist leaders could rule to a free system of trade and governing.
One of the primary factors contributing to the economic decay which, would make true reform impossible, was the ascendancy of the oligarchs. Under Yeltsin, concern with the prospect that the “population might soon have a change of heart and turn its back on reform…decided to accelerate it [privatization], selling off state resources and enterprises at little or no charge (Goldman, 2004, pp. 35). Goldman (2004) points out that through the “Loans for Shares” program Russian banks ended up being the direct beneficiaries of the auctions they were tasked with operating in order to privatize state controlled resources (pp. 35). The result was an oligarchy based system that was more representative of old aristocracies than free market democracies.
Yeltsin’s tenure also saw another great challenge. In his attempt to stimulate a new free market system, the political system was all but ignored (McFaul, 2000, pp. 53). Yeltsin’s inaction in making sure the political underpinnings were in place to support a free market resulted in a highly fragmented polity. Furthermore, Garnett (1997) indicates the continued use of previous Soviet institutions and officials served to exacerbate the political problems faced during that period as Ministers of the government and military leaders took it upon themselves to determine their own best course of action (pp. 64-65). Instead of a legacy of revolution and bravery in overturning a communist regime that survived for over 70 years, Yeltsin’s legacy at the time he left office was of a man who left Russia in worse economic and political turmoil than when he assumed power. It is noteworthy that he also left the people of Russia, and the world, with Vladimir Putin; leaving us to wonder whether Owen Harries (1989) questions about the trend towards freedom in the Soviet Union (now Russia) was accurately assessing just another example of an interlude of freedom in a culture with a history of dictatorship (pp. 45).
Vladimir Putin, a former member of the KGB, ascended to the position of Prime Minister by appointment from Yeltsin after being an effective chief of domestic security (Knight and Blair, 2000, pp. 35). Also, prior to being named Prime Minister, Putin also served as the head of Yeltsin’s Security Council at a time when Yeltsin was being threatened with impeachment; a position from which Putin was able to effectively intimidate the parliament and blackmail the prosecutor-general (Knight and Blair, 2000, pp. 35). Shortly after being named Prime Minister, Putin was named as Yeltsin’s successor to the presidency, a title which he would maintain after a subsequent election. Knight and Blair (2000) point out that in a time which Russian citizens valued order over freedom, Putin fit the bill rather nicely as he had “built an image as a tough, aggressive, anti-Western super-patriot”; exhibiting his strength in his handling of Chechnya and in his view towards the rest of the world (pp. 36). However, as long as the people are behind him, it is easy to maintain the appearance of freedom and democratic rule to the nations of the world.
Although there is plentiful evidence of a Russian system that is fundamentally flawed and thus ripe with opportunity for anti-Western antagonism, the truly relevant facts lie in what America has and will do to prevent a rerun of the half century period following WWII. There is no easy answer as to what amount of conflict avoidance is within US control and it is clearly beyond US foreign policy makers to dictate the path the citizens or government of Russia might take; however, we can work towards not only understanding, but accepting the potential for a foreign relations disaster that a reactionary Russian government might mean to the US and our global allies and interests.
The problems with American post-Cold War policy towards Russia arose almost as quickly as the great power had fallen. As the Soviet monolith was crumbling, President Bush and his administration were caught in between two philosophical concepts: 1) work to shore up and stabilize the existing Soviet structure and 2) abandon the established relationship with Gorbachev and embrace Yeltsin (Cox, 1994, pp. 639). This seems to have been a battle of philosophies within the president and his administration between realism, which more easily permits dealing with autocracies to further the national interests, and idealism which compels us to see a greater good to be had in following principles over pragmatism. This period of indecision left the first Bush administration open to severe criticism over the US’s management of the Soviet implosion and, among other factors, lead to the election of Bill Clinton into the White House.
Simultaneous with the division between upper policy makers and their would-be replacements was a media frenzy of the developments of freedom in the Soviet Union and its collapse which opened the doors for the people of Russia to engage in a new destiny of freedom and cooperation. It is not difficult to remember the sentiment of the American people at the time that the greatest threat to our own lives had finally given way to a new era of freedom that seemed inevitable in the wake of the Soviet collapse. This, coupled with the new rise of an idealistic view of the prerogative of the Russian people on the part of foreign policy elites, gives further evidence to the flaw inherent in ignoring cultural relativism. Idealism holds somewhat to the assumption that it is the leaders of a nation that are reflected in the policies of the state only, and ignores any relevance that it just may be the philosophies of the people of different states which are in conflict. In other words, the people of an enemy state are inherently good; it is only their leaders who promulgate any dissention between the two countries. Of course, hoping that tensions, between the US and a once equally strong adversary the likes of the Soviet Union, will be diminished organically is not bad; instead, it may just lack insight.
The Clinton administration took over the dealings with the new Russian federation with zeal towards propping up reform movements and guiding the move towards a free market democracy (Cox, 1994, pp. 646). This goal of nurturing Russia into a mirror image ally was pressed by Clinton’s primary advisor on Russian affairs, Strobe Talbott, and would eventually fall short. There were several obstacles toward shoring up Russian political and economic interests Cox (1994) points out, not the least of which was a continuing conflict between former Soviet states and the remnant of their oppressors (pp. 647). Additionally, Yeltsin even joined into the resurgent anti-western sentiments of the Russian people and establishment in the face of US attempts to fast-track the Russian state into line with western (particularly American) thinking (Cox, 1994, pp. 648).
The hopes of a fresh, new relationship with an old rival had fundamentally dissipated with the inability for Russian leaders to enact what they had promised; a free Russia filled with hope for a better future. Instead, by the end of the nineties, the Russian economy stood at less than half the capacity of the anemic Soviet economy that was revolted against (McFaul, 2000, pp. 45). Arguably, the increased contention between the US and Russia was (at least partially) due to the appearance of the US micro-managing the reforms being attempted in Russia, thus resulting in a retreat from the west by the Russians. McNamara and Blight (2001) later warned of the folly of any humiliation, and how it would serve as an impetus towards conflict, when they wrote of the factors which lead to a second rising of Germany in an attempt at world dominance which culminated in the ascension of Hitler’s Third Reich and the devastation that followed (pp. 68). Although well-intentioned in not wanting to miss an opportunity at developing a strong ally in Russia, the Clinton administration may have pushed too far, too fast; leaving the Russian leadership appearing a bit impotent to the world at large (at least from their own perspective). President Clinton did experience some victories, but the results of Russian reform were largely out of his hands.
However, a new era of US-Russia relations was soon to begin with the election of George W. Bush to the presidency and the appointment of Vladimir Putin to lead Russia. As the new decade began, antagonism was reestablished between the two states. The Bush administration took the Russian leadership “to task for arm sales to Iran” and the continued fighting in Chechnya (Bremmer and Zalavsky, 2001, pp. 12). The rhetoric would begin to change to potential reconciliation with the events of September 11, 2001. The US and Russia would find new common ground in the war on terrorism as both had an interest in reducing the destabilizing effects of terrorism. The new found partnership between Bush and Putin in a common goal elevated feelings that long term friendship and reconciliation over past conflict may be possible. Albeit far from perfect, the immediate years following September 11, 2001 seemed to have ushered in true cooperation between the two countries and, perhaps most importantly, between their respective leaders (Gladkyy, 2003, pp. 7).
As the decade moved on, there was a slow trend of regression from cooperation to heightened antipathy which came to a head (of sorts) with the Russian invasion of Georgia in August, 2008. This invasion seemed to provide the Russian leader with a significant amount of information. First, timing the invasion during the Beijing Olympics, provided significant cover for the action from gaining widespread media coverage (Maginnis, 2008). Second, it seemed to test the resolve of the US, particularly while still under the leadership of a president with severely diminished political capital. At the same time, coinciding with a new presidential election season in America gave Putin the opportunity to test the waters as to what kind of response President Bush’s successor may have to Russian aggression. Georgia was a valued US ally amongst the former Soviet bloc countries, and our inability to respond outside of expressing disappointment gave Putin all the answers he would need. A weak response from President Bush and, at best, a muted response from the two men who wished to replace Bush was evidence that the US had shifted its focus away from Russia and onto more pressing concerns; such as the Middle East and the economic crisis at home.
Furthermore, as Maginnis (2008) pointed out, President Saakashvili believed the invasion of Georgia additionally served as a notice to all neighboring “former Soviet-era satellite states” that “western orientation” will not be responded to kindly. This is plausible and harkens back to time in which Leonid Brezhnev enacted similar warnings so as to prevent any wholesale withdrawal from socialism and Soviet control (Wittkopf, et al, 2008, pp. 151).
When taking this period of the Bush administration into perspective it seems as if Putin may have been executing an almost perfect game of “three card monte” on the US. When encountered with criticism from Bush, Putin saw an opportunity (following 9/11) to endear the Russian state to the US and build a feeling of cooperation; all the while continuing the same activity that was originally considered unacceptable. When Putin sensed a weak moment in US foreign policy toward the end of President Bush’s second term, he took the opportunity to test the resolve of the international community, the US leadership, and perhaps foreshadow a future where expansionism would once again be the preferred tool of the Russian leadership. For example, four years since the invasion of Georgia and the Six Point Ceasefire Agreement that ended the conflict and there remains approximately 10,000 Russian troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia; representing “20 percent of Georgia’s internationally recognized territory and is in direct violation” of the treaty brokered by (then) French President Nicolas Sarkozy (Coffey, 2012, “Georgia and Russia…”).
During the Bush administration the focus, what was left of it anyway, came off of traditional intelligence concerns and was focused on a shift in overall defense preparedness and intelligence acquisition. Wittkopf, et al (2008) indicates an overall reduction in human intelligence, preferring increased technological sources, as a contributing factor for the attacks of September 11, 2001 (pp. 399). Although, President Bush sought to reverse this post-Cold War trend of decreasing human intelligence sources; it can be safely estimated that much of those new resources have been put toward the war on terrorism. When we add to this a wholesale realignment of the defense and intelligence community, it would be hardly imaginable that, to cope with the new and imminent threat posed by terrorist organizations, much of any remaining intelligences resources in the former Soviet bloc region would not have been either reassigned to the Middle East or exchanged for fresh, new intelligence operators; more schooled and prepared to work in the Muslim world.
Out of fairness to the Bush administration, the choices available in making adjustments to the new course would have been considerably limited due to the response the American public had to the attacks. Any perceived lag in government action in confronting the new enemy by either the administration or Congress could have had calamitous effects for the US. Not only would safety have been a potential issue, but increased economic backlash (particularly during a recession beginning primarily in 2000) from citizen perceived weakness in the federal government’s ability to protect its citizens; these factors would have only worsened the situation domestically. However, in a total restructuring, we potentially allow the urgent to outweigh the important and the increasing assertiveness, and even aggression, on the part of the Russians should serve as a stark reminder to not lose sight of any priorities.
This poses a dilemma, not just for presidents in the near future, but for the intelligence community as well. The shift from Cold War techniques to anti-terror strategies leaves the US with a learning curve in gaining assets that can facilitate strong intelligence; particularly challenging when dealing with a nation such as Russia, which is renowned for its capability in intelligence gathering and counterintelligence. Granted, it would be foolish to think that the US had ever withdrawn all of its intelligence capability from the region, but it would be reasonable to assert it has diminished its capacity dramatically. The effect of diminished intelligence would be a folly that spanned two administrations. The initial cutback in human intelligence capacity has been attributed to the Clinton administration by then CIA director George Tenet who stated that the administration’s decision was based on too much criminal behavior and human rights abuses by assets (Limbacher, 2004, “Tenet in Slap…”). Additionally, the Bush administration would be at fault for its seeming inability to see the potential need for solid intelligence in Russia in the near future, particularly in light of Russia’s posturing on certain issues and situations. Seeing that in 2004, Tenet also stated it would take at least five additional years of “rebuilding our clandestine service” just to get to high enough levels to effectively fight the war on terrorism, it becomes rational to assume that other fronts might still be left relatively unmonitored (Limbacher, 2004, “Tenet in Slap…”). These statements from Tenet not only indicate an intelligence community drawn down to anemic levels under the leadership of one president, but the replenishing of those capabilities being singularly applied by another.
Since the beginning of the Obama administration, our position toward Russian international policies has not changed remarkably from that at the end of the Bush administration. Russia continues to be suspected of dealing heavily in weapons and even nuclear technology to nations like Iran who would generally be considered as aggressors in rhetoric (at the very least). Additionally, our government has seemed to heed “warnings” from the Russians to not intervene in the revolution taking place in Syria; although, there was little hesitation in intervening in similar uprisings in Egypt and Libya. Whether or not we are idealists or realists, it might be prudent to realize that Russia bases its foreign policy on realism; therefore, we must be mindful that regardless of the US view of power as a determining factor of state actions that Russia is certainly cognizant of power as an influencer in foreign affairs. The chapter on the Obama administration has yet to be completed though; therefore, we are at the mercy of the future to some extent.
For the foreseeable future, I would predict an increase in Putin’s desire to explore the limits as to what the US will be willing to overlook in their (Russia’s) quest to regain status in the international community. As oil prices continue to stay high, the rich oil reserves of Russia, and the leverage they can provide diplomatically, will continue to be a growing factor in the equation. It seems reasonable that, if it is truly Putin’s goal to begin reestablishing a Soviet Union style empire, that former satellite states will be targeted for reincorporation into the federation. Perhaps an initial move into the smaller satellites such as Azerbaijan, Armenia, Estonia, and Latvia with a vision set on bigger prizes such as Ukraine. It will be interesting to see what course Putin may take in the event a new president is elected in November of this year; a new leader can often mean new limits and the campaign rhetoric certainly indicates a contrast between the president and his challenger.
All the military underpinnings still exist that could take Russia from a country in economic despair to a formidable military powerhouse in a short period of time. The US would be wise to keep close tabs on Russian alliances such as Iran, Syria, and China (particularly the latter for its shared communist tradition). All three are impressive allies in the region for Russia, although it seems less likely that China would wish to abandon its economic boom for another stroll down the lane of economic isolation that would be likely if tensions escalated too much.
The executive branch must stay engaged and not be too narrow sighted as to the threats of the day. Cabinet members, aides, advisors, and the Joint Chief’s will all play a pivotal role (regardless of whose administration) in managing the potential Russian threat in the future. Unfortunately, predicting how these players will act and react is difficult. The group of people making up this foreign policy core can change dramatically every four years and I would assume any direct threats may still be at least a decade away.
Additionally, responsibility must fall upon Congress as a check on executive decisions, particularly in the ultra-polarized political climate we are presently faced with; however, those members in Congress that sit on intelligence committees must act as honest brokers for, if ever there was a “water’s edge,” this would be it. Fortunately, we can count on the military industrial complex to assist in these oversight and monitoring activities, as there would be tremendous benefit if the Cold War was to come out of thaw. However, there has been what I would assess as lag in media response to this reemerging threat. This lack of media interest drives the (perhaps unintended) apathy of the common citizen in not having any electoral focus on this matter. We are, as citizens, far too consumed with the specter of terrorism; thus illustrating the often times singular, limited focus of Americans on issues of foreign policy.
Certainly, the exact details of whatever unfolds in the coming years between Russia and the US will be heavily dependent on the leadership of the two states. Seeing that Russia’s leadership has been relatively static over the last dozen years, the variables will arise from those leaders chosen in America. Just as different presidents tended to usher in variations in foreign policy towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War; the presidents and their appointees will be quite instrumental in determining the outcome of the growing struggle between the two historic foes. Just in the current campaign we can see a divergence of position on relations with Putin’s Russia, pointing towards a continued application of the hero-in-history model. Subsequently, those choices are made through a rational decision making model; however, it is instrumental rationality which separates one president’s vision from another. Idealist presidents tend towards idealist solutions, while those presidents with a strong core in realism are likely to view the very same challenges in often completely different ways. The challenge to our presidents arises from the fact that it is impossible to know which strategy is ultimately right until the game is over.
References
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